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Abstract
In a multi-agent system, a group of individ-
uals interact in a social context in order to
boost their capabilities and enhance global per-
formance. Each individual’s action repertoire
may be reduced, but it’s social capability allows
it to interact with other agents and obtain collab-
oration.
This work offers an alternative for knowledge
representation in a system of collaborative BDI
agents and presents an interaction protocol based
on dialogues.
The capacity to interact affects the behavioral
model of a BDI agent that must consider the
possibility of offering and soliciting collaboration.
Thus, we propose an algorithm that models the
behavior of a collaborative BDI agent.
Keywords: Multi-Agent Systems, Collaborative
Agents, Interaction Protocols, Defeasible Logic Pro-
gramming
1 Introduction
The agent metaphor is suited for modeling
dynamic applications subject to unforeseeable
changes in which a flexible response is expected.
In this work, an agent is conceived as an entity
situated in a dynamic environment and charac-
terized by basic properties such as purpose, reac-
tiveness, proactiveness and autonomy.
A rational agent is additionally endowed with
some capacity that allows it to select adequate
actions regarding its purpose. Autonomy guar-
antees that the agent can make decisions with a
certain level of independence with respect to its
environment. Rationality allows it to make good
decisions regarding the objectives put forth by the
purpose while taking the state of the world into
consideration.
The BDI model tries to capture the essence of
practical reasoning to determine an agent’s deci-
sion mechanism, and allows the selection at each
moment of the action to be performed according
to the current goal. An agent’s beliefs are made
up of all its knowledge about itself and its envi-
ronment. Its desires and intentions refer to the
state that it wishes to achieve.
An isolated BDI agent’s behavior is determined
by its individual motivations, its beliefs about
the world, and its own abilities. Autonomy im-
plies control over its behavior and over its internal
state. Rationality provides flexibility; the agent
reacts to changes that are produced in the world,
but it can also take initiative, i.e., it has a proac-
tive attitude. On the other hand, the possibility
of achieving its goals is restricted to its own cog-
nitive capability.
In a multi-agent system, a group of individuals
interact in a social context in order to boost their
individual capabilities and enhance global perfor-
mance. Each individual’s action repertoire may
be reduced, but it’s social capability allows it to
interact with other individuals and obtain col-
laboration. Thus, each individual tries to build
plans using its own action repertoire, but when
this repertoire is not sufficient, it requests col-
laboration and another member of the group can
elaborate plans to service the request. Participa-
tion in a social context generates opportunities
that do not come up in individual work, but it
also creates restrictions that need to be consid-
ered.
This work offers an alternative for knowledge
representation in a system of collaborative BDI
agents and presents an interaction protocol based
on dialogues. Interaction is initiated through a
global requirement put forth by an agent that has
formulated a plan for its committed intention but
that does not posses the full knowledge needed to
execute it. Among the individuals that are willing
and able to collaborate, the agent that solicited
the dialog chooses one in particular and initiates
a deliberative dialog.
The capacity to interact affects the behavior of
a BDI agent that must consider the possibility
of offering and soliciting collaboration. Thus, an
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extension to the algorithm is proposed that mod-
els the behavior of a BDI agent introduced in [4].
The extension takes into consideration the roles
that an agent may assume in a dialog as the ini-
tiator of the interaction or as a collaborator.
2 Practical Reasoning
An agent is a computational entity capable of per-
ceiving, reacting, and acting in an environment.
A rational agent adds to its perceptive, reactive,
and effectoric capabilities a certain level of prac-
tical reasoning that allows it to select the most
adequate action given its knowledge of its goals
and the state of the environment in which it is
situated [8]. That is, the cognitive capability of
the agent is what will allow it to act adequately
in each particular context.
Practical reasoning involves two fundamental pro-
cesses: deliberation and means-ends reasoning.
Deliberation allows to decide what goals will be
pursued and requires considering a set of alter-
native options, selecting some of them, and com-
mitting to realizing them. Means-ends reason-
ing determines how the committed goals will be
reached, that is it allows to build a plan that will
realize the agent’s intentions.
An agent modifies its intentions when it decides
that it won’t be able to reach them, or the rea-
sons for which they were chosen over other alter-
natives disappear. In this sense, an agent’s inten-
tions are linked to its beliefs about the world that
surrounds it.
The belief, desire, and intentions (BDI) model,
based on practical reasoning, provides the essen-
tial elements for representing the mental attitude
of a rational agent that acts in a dynamic envi-
ronment subject to sudden and frequent changes.
Beliefs make up the agent’s knowledge about it-
self and the environment that surrounds it. Its
desires refer to the state that it wishes to reach
and represent its motivations. Intentions consti-
tute committed goals that condition and control
future activities. The most important character-
istics of intentions are:
• An agent frequently selects a course of action
geared towards satisfying an intention, which
fails. Generally, an agent does not abandon
the intention immediately, and it tries again
in a different way. An agent is expected to
persist in its intention and perform a reason-
able number of tries.
• Once an agent adopts an intention, this in-
tention will act as a restriction over future
practical reasoning. The actions chosen after
the moment in which an intention is defined
must be consistent with it.
• An agent’s intentions are strongly linked to
its beliefs about the future. A behavior will
not be rational if it adopts an intention while
believing that it is not possible to achieve.
All of these qualities intervene in the process of
practical reasoning, but they frequently collide
with each other. An intention may be abandoned
after many failed tries or because an agent adopts
a new one that is inconsistent with the former.
Clearly, having failed a certain number of times
the agent will start doubting the feasibility of
bringing about its committed goals, and this goal
will lose its ties with the agent’s beliefs. However,
it is difficult to find a balance between constant
deliberation while reconsidering intentions, and
indefinitely persisting in them.
Formally, the state of a BDI agent at a given mo-
ment can be represented by a triple < B,D, I >
such that B ⊆ Bel, D ⊆ Des, and I ⊆ Int, where
Bel is the set of all possible beliefs, Des is the set
of all possible desires, and Int is the set of all
possible intentions [4].
The agent’s belief revision function can be defined
as a mapping
brf : ℘(Bel)× P → ℘(Bel)
that determines a new set of beliefs from the set
of perceptions P and the current beliefs. The
options generating function maps sets of beliefs
and intentions into sets of desires:
options : ℘(Bel)× ℘(Int)→ ℘(Des)
Options must be in some sense opportunistic in
that they must recognize characteristics of the en-
vironment and the agent’s knowledge that allow
to anticipate success in the planning process if
they are chosen as intentions.
The deliberation process can be represented
through a function of the form:
deliber : ℘(Bel)× ℘(Des)× ℘(Int)→ ℘(Int)
that modifies intentions given previous beliefs, de-
sires, and intentions. This function allows aban-
doning intentions that are not reachable (at least
at a reasonable cost), retain those that can still
produce a global benefit, and adopt new ones that
will allow the agent to come closer to the exist-
ing ones or explore new opportunities. That is,
new intentions are obtained from previous ones
or from new options.
The plan function returns a sequence of actions
given a set of beliefs and the committed intention:
plan : ℘(Int)× ℘(Bel)→ Π
The algorithm proposed in [5] to specify the be-
havior of a BDI agent is:
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B ← B0
I ← I0
while true do
get next percept p
B ← brf(B, p)
D ← options(B, I)
I ← deliber(B,D, I)
Π← plan(B, I)
execute(Π)
end while
The sets B0 and I0 correspond to the initial be-
liefs and intentions. In applications in which the
environment suffers frequent changes, the algo-
rithm can be progressively refined to incorporate
reactivity and intention reconsideration. In this
case, the execute operation does not cover the en-
tire plan; after executing each individual action
there is a perception and an analysis of the ne-
cessity of adjusting it. Intention reconsideration
allows to take advantage of changes and make the
best of new opportunities [5].
2.1 A Behavioral Model for a BDI
Agent
An alternative to the view proposed in the previ-
ous section is a model in which an agent’s desires
are not determined from the current beliefs and
previous intentions, but are perceived as needs in
the environment. That is, the options(B, I) func-
tion is eliminated, and in its place desires are up-
dated by a desire revision function that considers
perception P :
drf : ℘(Des)× P → ℘(Des)
The deliberation operation is also modified
because instead of considering the intentions
previously reached, it selects a new intention
considering exclusively the assigned goals and
the current beliefs. The algorithm is now:
B ← B0
D ← D0
while true do
get next percept p
B ← brf(B, p)
D ← drf(D, p)
I ← deliber(B,D)
Π← plan(B, I)
execute(Π, B)
end while
Once again, the execute(P,B) operation can
include an intention reconsideration mechanism
such that after the execution of each action the
perceived changes in the world are considered,
and a decision is made as to if it is possible to
continue as planned, if the plan needs modifica-
tions, or a different intention is selected.
The BDI model is abstract, it does not specify
how an agent’s beliefs are represented, nor does
it propose a concrete mechanism for deliberating
and a specific planning strategy. The selection
of intentions can be carried out in different ways,
one of which is that all desires have the same im-
portance, while another is to associate a priority
to each desire.
In this work, the set of goals that an agent per-
ceives and incorporates to its desires corresponds
to the actions that it is capable of executing. This
does not guarantee that an executable plan can
be built because the set of beliefs can be insuf-
ficient, in which case we decide that the plan is
incomplete. When the execution of a plan finishes
successfully, the intention has been reached and
becomes a belief.
In the following we briefly describe the formalism
adopted for representing a BDI agent’s knowledge
and for supporting planning. Later on we propose
a variation of the algorithm modeling the behav-
ior of a BDI agent adding collaboration.
2.2 Representation of a BDI
Agent’s Knowledge
The BDI model provides the essential elements
for representing the mental attitude of a ratio-
nal agent that acts in a dynamic environment,
subject to sudden and frequent changes. Beliefs
make up the agent’s knowledge about the world,
and its desires and intentions refer to the state
that it wishes to reach, as well as representing its
motivations and commitments. The effectoric ca-
pability is constituted by the set of actions that
it is capable of executing.
Definition 2.1 [Argumentative BDI agent]
An argumentatve-BDI agent awill be denoted with
the tuple a = 〈B,D, ι,Γ〉, where B represents the
agent’s beliefs, D its desires, ι the agent intention
and Γ a set of actions that the agent is able to
execute.
The agent’s beliefs B will be represented by a re-
stricted Defeasible Logic Program (Φ,∆), where
Φ is a consistent set of facts, and ∆ a set of defea-
sible rules. The interested reader is referred to [2]
for full details about DeLP.
Besides its beliefs, desires, and intentions, an
agent will have a set of actions Γ that it may
use to change its world. The formal definitions
that were introduced in [1] are recalled below.
An agent’s desires are represented as a set of lit-
erals. An intention is a specific literal, selected
from the set of desires as a committed goal.
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Definition 2.2 [Action] An action A is an or-
dered triple 〈P, X, C〉, where P is a set of literals
representing preconditions for A, X is a consis-
tent set of literals representing consequences of
executing A, and C is a set of constraints of the
form not L, where L is a literal. We will denote
actions as follows:
{X1, . . . , Xn} A←− {P1, . . . , Pm}, not {C1, . . . , Ck}
Notice that the notation not {C1, . . . , Ck} repre-
sents {not C1, . . . , not Ck}.
Definition 2.3 [Applicable Action] Let B =
(Φ,∆) be an agent’s beliefs and Γ the set of ac-
tions available to that agent. An action A in Γ,
defined as before, is applicable if every precondi-
tion Pi in P has a warrant built from (Φ,∆) and
every constraint Ci in C fails to be warranted.
Definition 2.4 [Action Effect] Let B = (Φ,∆)
be an agent’s beliefs and Γ the set of actions avail-
able to that agent. Let A be an applicable action
in Γ defined as before. The effect of executing A is
the revision of Φ by X, i.e., Φ∗X = Φ∗{X1,...,Xn}.
Revision will consist of removing any literal in Φ
that is complementary of any literal in X and then
adding X to the resulting set. Formally:
Φ∗X = Φ∗{X1,...,Xn} = (Φ− X) ∪ X
where X is the set of complements of members of
X.
In [1] we have shown that the interaction between
actions and the defeasible argumentation formal-
ism is twofold. On one hand, as stated by Def-
inition 2.3, defeasible argumentation is used for
testing preconditions and constraints through the
warrant notion. On the other hand, actions may
be used by agents in order to change the world
(actually the set Φ) and then have a warrant for
a literal L that has no warrant from the current
knowledge base (Φ,∆).
2.3 Planning with Defeasible Argu-
mentation
When an agent a adopts an intention ι, and ι is
not warranted by (Φ,∆) agent a looks for an ac-
tion A in Γ that modifies the beliefs in such a way
that an argument without defeaters that supports
ι can be obtained. If A cannot be executed be-
cause its preconditions are not warranted, a elab-
orates a sequence of actions that allows it to es-
tablish them. The complete sequence, including
A, will make up a plan for ι.
Each action in the plan can modify the beliefs by
adding literals that allow to build new arguments.
When the execution of intention ι is complete, it
is added to the set B of beliefs.
The selection of actions is not a trivial task, and
the classic issues that arise in planning are re-
flected in the argumentative scheme. In a se-
quence of actions [A1,A2], A2 can be applicable
according to the initial state Φ, but not after A1 is
executed. Therefore, the consequences of A1 can
modify Φ in such a way that A2’s preconditions
are not warranted, or a constraint is warranted.
The execution of A1 can add literals that allow
to build new defeaters for the preconditions of A2
and eliminate literals that allow the construction
of warrants for the preconditions of A2. The cri-
terion proposed in [1] for selecting actions is to
minimize the unwanted changes in the precondi-
tions and constraints.
We have stated that in this work an agent only
adopts intentions for which it can build at least
one plan. That is, there is at least one action
among whose post-conditions is the literal that
corresponds to the intention. However, it is pos-
sible that the preconditions of this action are not
satisfied considering the agent’s set of beliefs, and
that the agent cannot elaborate a plan that will
allow it to generate them. In this case, the plan
will be incomplete. If the agent is isolated, an
incomplete plan cannot be executed.
When an agent is part of a system, and its ca-
pabilities are insufficient for completing a plan, it
can request collaboration. However, its actions
can interfere with the plans of other members. If
its attitude is cooperative, it will provide collabo-
ration when it receives requests, and will request
authorization to make changes that may affect
others.
3 Collaboration among BDI
Agents
An individual agent’s plan is built considering
only its beliefs, intentions, and abilities. When
an agent is part of a system, it can interact with
other members of the system in which it partici-
pates to make use of its beliefs and abilities.
Interaction allows more possibilities of reaching
the committed goals, but it also requires consid-
ering the impact that the social behavior has over
knowledge representation, the deliberative mech-
anism, the planning process, and each individual
agent’s behavior model.
In this work, interaction is structured in dialogues
between agents that seek to collaborate in order
to augment their individual capabilities. The be-
havior of the interlocutors is still rational, that is,
as before each individual must balance the effort
that it allocates to elaborate an effective plan, in
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relation to the time that it employs in executing
it. Furthermore, in a dialogue, each agent allo-
cates resources for requesting and providing col-
laboration; once again it is important to maintain
a balance between interaction and the execution
of plans.
3.1 Dialogues in a Cooperative
Context
A dialogue is a sequence of locutions that are ex-
changed between two interlocutors that share the
same objective and try to follow a turn taking
model. The objective is to reach an agreement;
each participant has associated a set of proposi-
tions that are adequate to it and consistent with
its own goals. The dialogue can be thought of
as a dialogical game in which the players apply
different strategies in trying to balance the inten-
tion of reaching their goals and the commitment
to collaborate.
When the dialogue evolves, the set of agreements
of each interlocutor is modified to incorporate or
remove propositions. There are different ways of
dialoguing, and dialogues can be grouped into
types according to different criteria, but all of
them require a certain level of commitment and
argumentation.
One criterion for classifying dialogues is to iden-
tify the goals and initial situations that regulate
them in order to characterize each particular type
and distinguish it from the rest, following the pro-
posals of [].
The following list presents some types of very gen-
eral dialogues, without intending to offer a com-
plete taxonomy but only to identify the models
that are significant for supporting communication
and coordination [9].
– Persuasive dialogue
– Negotiation
– Inquiry
– Information Seeking
– Deliberation
All of the models mentioned have a characteristic
in common, and that is that the interlocutors act
in a context of trust and cooperation. Even when
they may disagree, the relation is not antagonis-
tic, there are no attacks and the realization of
the goals are not evaluated in terms of individual
defeats or victories.
The initial situation in a persuasive dialogue is
the conflict between different points of view, and
the objective is that one of the parts change its
stance through the dialectic process. In the sim-
plest case, one of the parts has a positive take on a
given proposition, while the other has a negative
view of the same proposition.
The goal of a negotiation dialogue is to reach a
shared agreement. Each participant tries to make
this agreement be as close as possible to its own
interests. Even though the spirit of collabora-
tion exists, there is also an implicit purpose of
maintaining individual motivations. The dialec-
tic process can be thought of as a search process
oriented towards finding a situation that is ade-
quate for both parts.
Inquiry is a type of dialogue oriented towards
proving propositions to answer a question or solve
a problem that is recognized and shared. The di-
alectical process is very similar to that of a per-
suasive dialogue, and in both cases if the dialogue
is successful, the participants adopt the same con-
clusion. The difference lies in the initial state,
because an inquiry does not start with a conflict
between two points of view, but with an open
problem.
Information seeking begins when an agent needs
information about a particular subject. Contrary
to an inquiry, the relation between the partici-
pants is asymmetric because one of them mani-
fests its ignorance and expects to become richer
with the knowledge of the other, without requir-
ing a proof that backs the response.
A deliberative dialogue begins, like an inquiry,
with an open problem. However, in this case it
has a practical nature, and the goal is a decision
on how to act. In the deliberation process, each
participant can try to influence the final solution,
sharing in this case characteristics of persuasive
dialogues.
It is clear that the five types of dialogues de-
scribed are not separated by absolute limits, and
on occasions a dialogical game can have elements
of two or more types. Frequently, a dialogical
game that initially corresponds to a certain type
is transformed into a different one as a response
to the evolution of the context in which it devel-
ops. The transition is not always clear, and often
a dialogue becomes embedded in another one that
precedes it and later follows it.
The importance of identifying what type a partic-
ular dialogue fits is related to the need for recog-
nizing the level of commitment of each part with
respect to the goal, and identifying what situa-
tions determine that the process finishes success-
fully or not. In this work, the interaction between
agents corresponds to a deliberative dialogue in
which the interlocutors exchange proposals and
counterproposals trying to make effective collab-
oration.
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3.2 Knowledge Representation in a
Social Context
A BDI agent is characterized by exhibiting flexi-
ble behavior and being capable of taking actions
autonomously according to its mental attitudes.
In a multi-agent system, the representation of
cognitive capability covers two important aspects.
First, the relation between knowledge and action,
that is, how an agent’s knowledge about its envi-
ronment and its own goals determines its behav-
ior. Second, how knowledge influences the inter-
action with other agents.
In a social context, each individual acts and inter-
acts considering what it knows about the world,
including what it knows about what the rest
knows [6]. In applications in which agents have
conflicting goals, this aspect is fundamental. If a
seller agent offers a product that has a defect, for
instance a house with problems in the rain gut-
ters, it may conceal this situation and act in a
certain manner as long as the possible buyer is
not aware of the situation. However, if the seller
knows that the possible buyer knows about the
state of the gutters, its attitude may be different.
The knowledge about the world that is main-
tained by the agents in a system can then be
organized in different ways. The weakest way is
that beliefs are distributed between the members
of the system, each of which maintains its own set
of beliefs. In this model, each agent may perceive
different aspects of the real world and may also
have a different view of a particular aspect. Be-
cause of this consideration, it is probable that the
beliefs of a member of the group are inconsistent
with those of the rest.
The strictest alternative is to maintain the set
of beliefs shared by all the members of the sys-
tem. Any modification of the knowledge will af-
fect everyone. However, joining all of the agents’
beliefs invalidates the advantages of a system di-
vided into modules. Thus, the entire model could
be reduced to an only agent.
An intermediate position, according to what is
proposed in [3], is to maintain part of the dis-
tributed shared beliefs between pairs of agents.
When an agent needs collaboration, it interacts
with another member of the group by means of
a dialogue. If the request can be serviced, the
shared beliefs between the two are modified. Fur-
thermore, there exists a set of facts known to all
members of the group that make up the global
shared beliefs, and whose modification involves
general consensus.
In the proposed model, individual beliefs of each
agent are composed by their specific beliefs, the
shared beliefs with each of the other members of
the group, and the global shared beliefs. Every
set of individual beliefs is consistent.
Definition 3.1 [Multiagent System] A sys-
tem composed of collaborative BDI agents is de-
scribed as MS = 〈A,K,KP 〉, where A is a set
of agents, K is the set of global shared beliefs,
and KP = {(ai,aj ,Kij)} represents the family
of sets of shared beliefs between every pair ai,aj
of agents in A.
In the BDI model, the cognitive capability of an
agent includes its beliefs, but also its desires and
intentions. In this work, the presence of other
individuals in the environment affects the set of
desires that now will not only include the goals
perceived as necessary, but also the collaboration
requests. Thus, the set D of each individual will
be composed by the goals that correspond to goals
perceived in the world and to collaboration re-
quests of other members of the system. That is,
D =M∪R, where M are the goals and R are
the received collaboration requests.
The desire perception function drf(D, p) is re-
placed by a pair of functions rrf(R, p) and
grf(M,p) that repeatedly perceive collaboration
requests and goals, respectively. During the de-
liberation process the collaboration requests and
the goals perceived in the world will compete with
each other.
3.3 A Dialogical Protocol for Col-
laborative Agents
The behavior of a collaborative BDI agent is more
complex than that of an isolated agent. In this
work, every member of a system acts motivated
by its goals, but also considers the collaboration
requests that it receives. An individual requests
collaboration when its beliefs are insufficient for
executing the plans that allow it to reach its goals.
Thus, the existence of other members is going to
allow it to request and obtain collaboration, but
it will also require a certain capability for inter-
action.
When an agent a1 requires a literal p, and cannot
find a warrant for it nor elaborate a sequence of
actions that allows it to add it, it performs a call
for dialogue requesting collaboration in relation
to p.
Each of the other members of the system per-
ceives the global request for collaboration, and
two situations can arise: an agent has available
an action among whose post-conditions is p, or
not. In the first case, it incorporates the request
into its set of desires, while in the latter it re-
jects the request because none of the actions that
make up its effectoric capabilities allows it to ser-
vice the request, and therefore cannot elaborate
a plan for p.
If a request is selected as an intention, the agent
notifies its availability to collaborate and waits
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for a specific request. For each request that is
not adopted as an intention, the agents must no-
tify that they are not available. In the call, an
agent initiates the interaction through a global
request for the rest of the members of the system,
as shown in Figure 1. Figure 2 shows the sequence
diagram in UML for the call for dialogue.
Iniciator Agents
request_all
Figure 1: Roles Diagram for call for dialogue.
request_all
free
enable
request_for
unable
INICIATOR Agent
reject
Figure 2: Sequence diagram for call dialogue.
As shown in the diagram, every agent that re-
ceives the global request responds according to
one of the following situations:
a) It does not adopt p as a committed intention,
and rejects the request.
b) None of the actions that make up its effectoric
capabilities allows it to service the request, and
therefore cannot elaborate a plan for p; this is
informed.
c) Adopts p as a committed intention, and indicates
its availability to collaborate.
Interaction with those agents that reject the re-
quest or inform that they are not available to ser-
vice it ends directly. Agent a1 selects an agent
among those that have manifested their availabil-
ity, say a2, with which it initiates a deliberative
dialogue through a specific request for p.
Agent a2 may have a complete plan for p, or may
request collaboration with respect to another lit-
eral q. In this case, it performs a counterproposal
to agent a1 with respect to q. Both agents then
exchange proposals and counterproposals, trying
to make effective collaboration, until the dialogue
ends. Figure 3 shows the sequence diagram in
UML for the deliberative dialogue.
request_for
P&C Protocol
accept
INICIATOR COLABORATOR
propose
P&C Protocol
unable
accept
Bidder Counter-Bidder
Figure 3: Deliberative Dialogue and P&C Proto-
col.
When an agent receives a counterproposal it re-
sponds:
a) Indicating that it cannot elaborate a plan
that allows it to satisfy the request
b) Accepting the request
c) Performing a counterproposal
The behavior of a BDI agent must consider the
two roles with which it can interact. That is, as
initiator of a dialogue or as collaborator. As we
will see in the following, the algorithm is extended
to reflect that an agent can accept to participate
in a dialogue when it receives a collaboration re-
quest, and also perform itself a global request to
initiate a dialogue.
3.4 Behavioral Model for a Collab-
orative BDI Agent
The possibility of obtaining collaboration will al-
low every agent to elaborate plans that will re-
quire the application of knowledge from the other
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member of the system. In the following algo-
rithm, when an agent adopts an intention that
corresponds to an individual goal and elaborates a
plan that is not complete, it initiates a call for di-
alogue by means of the request operation, which
may end successfully or not.
In the case in which the committed intention
corresponds to a request for collaboration, the
agent adopts the opposite role in the dialogue.
That is, it manifests its disposition to collaborate
by means of the dialogue operation, and waits
for the start of a deliberative dialogue.
B ← B0
D ← D0
while true do
get next percept p
B ← brf(B, p) {belief revision}
M ← grf(G, p) {goal revision}
R ← rrf(R, p) {collaboration request revi-
sion}
I ← deliber(B,M,R)
P ← plan(Π, I)
if i ∈ R then
OK ← dialogue()
else
if incomplete(Π) then
OK ← request()
end if
end if
check(B,Π, OK)
if OK then
execute(Π, B)
end if
end while
The intention adopted in the deliberative process
may correspond to a goal or to a collaboration re-
quest; in both cases the agent elaborates a plan.
If the intention corresponds to a collaboration re-
quest, it notifies its disposition to collaborate and
if it receives a specific request a dialogue will be
generated between the agent that initiated the
interaction and the collaborator.
In the case in which the intention corresponds
to a perceived goal, the agent elaborates a plan
that may not be complete, that is, its beliefs are
not sufficient to satisfy the preconditions of the
plan. It then initiates the interaction with other
members of the group by means of a global col-
laboration request.
The check function requires perceiving the world
again and deciding if the plan is complete, con-
sidering the current state. In the case in which
this is so, the plan is executed. Once again, the
execute operation can be extended to allow that
after the execution of each action the state of the
world to be perceived, and the necessary adjust-
ments made.
As before, when an agent completes the execution
of a plan elaborated for reaching a committed in-
tention, its beliefs are modified. If the intention
corresponds to a desire perceived in the world,
the set of global shared beliefs is updated. In
the case in which the intention corresponds to a
request for collaboration, the knowledge shared
between the interlocutors is modified.
In both cases, the execution of the plan can mod-
ify other beliefs, apart from those linked to the
committed intention. If the modification affects
the set of beliefs shared with another member of
the system, both must agree on the change. If the
belief is part of the global knowledge, all agents
must authorize the modification.
4 Conclusions and Future
Work
In a multi-agent system, a group of autonomous
entities can collaborate in solving a problem that
escapes each individual’s capabilities. In a coop-
erative environment, each BDI agent’s reasoning
involves deliberation and planning, but a certain
social commitment is added. In this work, social
commitment allows each member of the system
to provide and request collaboration by partici-
pating in deliberative dialogues.
Individual autonomy and social commitment are
two properties that oppose each other. The for-
mer allows each agent to act guided by its own
goals, independently of the environment to which
it belongs. Social commitment restricts the way
in which agents interact and influences individual
behavior, limiting the level of autonomy.
As in a human organization, the specification of
norms, roles, and relations allows to balance au-
tonomy with the social commitment that is im-
posed when being part of a group. Individual be-
havior and interaction are determined by a rela-
tion between the roles that the interlocutors have
during the dialogue. That is, the structure in
which the roles are related within the organiza-
tion restricts the possible locutions in certain mo-
ments of the dialogue. Autonomy is still an im-
portant quality, but constrained by the behavior
expected of the role in the context that deter-
mines the structure of relations.
Our future work is then oriented towards the in-
troduction of norms, roles, and relations in the
agent system representation, and the modifica-
tion of each agent’s individual behavior and the
interaction protocol. The evolution of each par-
ticular dialogue will be determined by the interac-
tion protocol and the relation between the specific
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roles that the interlocutors occupy. The initiation
of a dialogue depends on the individual behavior
of the agent that requests collaboration, and that
of the one that provides it.
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